Who Signed Peace Agreement with Taliban

More than 1,200 miles away, at the time of the signing, another senior U.S. official, Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper, was in Kabul with Afghan officials to ease the Afghan government`s concerns. Together with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, they issued a statement reaffirming the United States` commitment to support the Afghan military. The Taliban have also agreed to start peace talks with the Afghan government and to consider a ceasefire with the government. (The Taliban, meanwhile, had killed Afghan forces and tried to use force as leverage in negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials believed.) The United States, which has fought to guarantee better rights for women and minorities and to create a democratic system and institutions in Afghanistan, has reached an agreement with an insurgency that has never clearly renounced its desire for a government and judicial system rooted in a strict interpretation of Islam. The agreement required the U.S. to reduce its forces from 13,000 to 8,600 within three to four months, with the remaining U.S. forces withdrawing in 14 months or before May 1. Miller said it was the “right approach” and necessary to force Ghani to negotiate.

He said the Doha deal should always be the “first phase” of the process, with the next part being that the US uses its influence for Ghani to negotiate a power-sharing deal with the Taliban. Mehdi J. Hakimi, executive director of the Rule of Law Program and a lecturer at Stanford Law School, gives an overview of the current state of the U.S.-Taliban agreement and peace negotiations, including the possibility of a U.S. military withdrawal in the final weeks of the Trump administration and the challenges facing the upcoming Biden administration. Chris Miller, acting defense secretary in the final months of the Trump administration, angered the idea that Biden was handcuffed by the deal. Although the peace process is supported by a large majority of Afghans, many issues still need to be resolved during intra-Afghan negotiations, including the division of power, the disarmament and reintegration of Taliban fighters into society, and the determination of the future of the country`s democratic institutions and constitution. These negotiations had already had a precarious start after the agreement between the United States and the Taliban in February. The U.S. and Taliban agreed to release up to five thousand Taliban prisoners in exchange for a thousand Afghan security forces, but the Afghan government said it had not engaged in such an exchange. Esper stressed that if the Taliban violated the promises, “the United States would not hesitate to cancel the agreement.” President-elect Biden and his administration will have to take a close look at the behavior of the Taliban, which so far appears to be in violation of their obligations under the February agreement. A hasty withdrawal when the Taliban have close ties to terrorist groups is very risky. U.S.

Allies and coalition partners, as well as the UN Security Council and regional parties to the conflict, have expressed support for the U.S.-Taliban agreement and the joint statement between the U.S. and Afghanistan. However, these recent peace efforts in Afghanistan will be difficult to implement given the uncertainty about the United States` timetable for the withdrawal of troops and the lifting of sanctions against the Taliban, concerns about the future of counterterrorism operations under these agreements, and the apparent resurgence of the Taliban over the past year. But the deal leaves an unpleasant reality for the Trump administration: it signed an agreement with a movement in which an officially listed terrorist group, the Haqqani Network, known for its suicide bombing campaign, is an integral part of the leadership. The head of the network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is the deputy head and military commander of the Taliban. The Taliban`s biggest concrete commitment looked like this: for seven days before the agreement was signed, their leaders significantly scaled back their attacks on Afghan forces to show that they were capable of controlling the group across the country. But the deal did not require the Taliban to stop attacking Afghan security forces. Second, to prevent “armed groups” or “terrorist groups” from using Afghanistan as a base, the US-Taliban agreement and the joint statement recognize that the Taliban and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) must conduct counterterrorism operations. Neither the agreement recognizes whether the Taliban and ANDSF – and, if so, coalition forces – will coordinate these operations, as they will confirm that the attacks were not carried out or supported by subgroups within the Taliban, or how the Taliban will prove that they suppressed the Islamic State in the Khorasan operations. In addition, the Taliban`s ties to al-Qaeda, largely through the Haqqani network, could prove difficult. Despite the agreement to sever relations with terrorist groups under the agreement signed with the United States, a UN report released in May 2020 [PDF] noted that the Taliban remain in close contact with al-Qaeda. These negotiations were supposed to begin within a month of signing the agreement, but were delayed due to disputes between the Taliban and the Afghan government over the release of prisoners.

Amid the seizures and early stages, negotiations had yielded no results when Biden announced his exit decision in April. Since then, they haven`t either. “If he had thought the deal was bad, he could have renegotiated. He had ample opportunity to do so if he wanted to,” Miller, a senior Pentagon counterterrorism official at the time of signing the Doha agreement, said in an interview. Another related issue is coordination with America`s allies. The February agreement stipulates that all foreign forces will leave Afghanistan on time – a provision that poses a difficult dilemma for NATO and coalition partners, especially given the real conditions on the ground. India. New Delhi is a strong supporter of the Afghan government and has provided $3 billion since 2001 to develop infrastructure and maintain business in Afghanistan. Its main objectives are to minimize Pakistan`s influence and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for anti-Indian militants. The Indian government did not support the United States.

sought a deal with the Taliban and did not agree to legitimize the group as a political actor. After more than eighteen years of war in Afghanistan, the United States and the Taliban have reached an agreement in the most intensive efforts by both sides to date to end the war. At the heart of the agreement is a significant withdrawal of US troops and Taliban guarantees that the country will not become a safe haven for terrorists. Ruby Wax reflects on her conversation about “car accidents” with Donald Trump CPA recently released a memorandum on contingency planning, “A Failed Afghan Peace Deal,” by Seth G. Jones, Harold Brown Chairholder and Director of the Transnational Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Jones discusses the significant obstacles that still exist for an intra-Afghan peace deal and outlines steps the U.S. can take to prevent a failed peace deal in Afghanistan. Under the May 2020 power-sharing agreement between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, Abdullah was appointed chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, a group that will have the final say on whether or not to sign a negotiated agreement with the Taliban. In June 2020, the Taliban and the Afghan government confirmed that they would meet in Doha for the first round of talks; However, the Afghan government was cautious in designing the expected meeting, stressing that no agreement or consensus had been reached at a venue for direct negotiations. .